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of the  subject and  to the  idea th a t individuals are  the  basic 
u n its  of social action. B ut I shall no t a ttem pt to give a 
com prehensive exposition of the theory of autopoiesis as 
developed by Luhm ann2. Instead, some aspects of L uhm ann’s 
am bitious and  complex theory shall be picked out and  treated  
in  a  ra th e r non-system atic way, drawing on his contributions 
to legal theory and the critique of ideology. This shall be done 
so a s  to jux tapose  his theoretical outline w ith those of Anglo-
2 From  L uhm ann’s writings on the topic there  are now 
availbale Ecological Communication. Cambridge: Polity Press 
(1989); E ssa ys  on Self-Reference. New York: Colum bia 
University Press (1990, forthcoming). Stanford University 
Press prepares a  transla tion  of Soziale Systèm e. For o ther 
contributions, see the articles in H um berto M atu rana  and 
Francisco Varela (eds.) Autopoietic System s. A  Characterization 
o f the Living Organization, U rbana (111.) (1975); H. M aturana 
and  F. V araela (eds.) Autopoiesis and  Cognition. The 
Realization o f  the Living. Dordrecht: Reidei (1980); Milan 
Zeleny (ed.) Autopoiesis: A  Theory o f Living Organization, New 
York: Elsevier (1981); G unther Teubner (ed.) Autopoietic Law: 
A New Approach to Law  and Society, Berlin: de G ruyter 
(1988); G unther Teubner (ed.) State, Law, Economy as 
Autopoietic System s, Milano: Giuffré (1990, forthcoming). For 
a  lenghty review article, see A rthur J . Jacobson  ’Autopoietic 
Law: The New Science of Niklas L uhm ann’ in  87 Michigan 
Law  Review  (1989), pp. 1647-1689. For a  general 
represen tation  of L uhm ann’s work in English, see h is Trust 
and  Power. Chichester: Wiley (1979); Differentiation o f  Society. 
New York: Columbia University Press (1982); A Sociological 
Theory o f Law. London: Routedge (1985); Love as Passion. 
Cambridge: Polity Press (1986); Political Theory in the Welfare 




























































































Reiner G randm am i
Luhmann conservative, Luhmann progressive'
The lawyer has to legitimate the 
world as it is.
Jacob Taubes
If we presuppose society as it is the 
only thing we can do is to conserve 
it.
Niklas Luhmann
Writing on Luhm ann for an  Anglo-american readership, one 
could be tempted to adopt a habit of explaining autopoiesis in 
a way rem iniscent of Lyotard’s well-known booktitle* 1. This is 
not m eant to be presum ptuous or provocative. The theoretical 
traditions of German and Anglo-american thought are quite 
distinct, a  fact which m akes comm unication across the 
boarders difficult. The most single im portant difference is 
perhaps Luhm ann’s abolition of any appeal to the philosophy
I w ish to th an k  Niklas Luhm ann, Sean  Sm ith and 
G un ther T eubner for valuable com m ents.





























































































am erican theorists, su ch  as Rawls’. B ut som e a tten tion  is also 
paid to H aberm as’ competing project. In fact, m any of the 
Anglo-am erican audience know  Luhm ann’s system  theory only 
from a  F rankfurtian  reading. This reading n u rtu red  a  long­
stand ing  aversion tow ards system s theoiy  which is regarded 
as  technocratic3. The p resen t article tries to reconsider such  
a  judgem ent.
The two epigram s4 a t the  beginning of the  tex t seem  to 
suggest th a t  Luhm ann is prim arily in terested  in justifying 
existing order, no t to criticise or to change it. However, th is 
im pression is contradicted by sta tem ents w here Luhm ann
3 Cf. Robert Lilienfeld, ’System s Theory as an  Ideology’ in 
42 Social Research  pp. 637-660 (1975); Peter Ludz, ’M arxism 
and  System s Theory in  a  B ureaucratic Society’ in 42 Social 
Research  pp. 661-674 (1975).
4 In th e  original they read  as follows; ’Der J u r is t  muJ3 die 
Welt, wie sie ist, legitimieren. Solange au ch  n u r  eine 
ju ris tische  Form gefunden werden kann , m it welcher 
Spitzfindigkeit au ch  imm er, ist es unbedingt zu tun , denn 
so n st regiert das C haos.’ (Jacob Taubes, A d Carl Schmitt. 
Gegenstrebige Fügung. Berlin: Merve (1987), p.72) and  ’If 
society is supposed  to be w hat it is, then  the problem  can  be 
only to conserve society, to continue solving its problem s, and 
possibly to improve problem  solving and  to overcome 
unexpecetd difficulties.' Niklas Luhm ann, Tautology and 
Paradox in  th e  self-Descriptions of M odem  Society’ in 6 




























































































defends him self against exactly such  charges. For example, he 
says th a t he does not w ant to justify  existing system s and 
their functions, th a t he does not in a  norm ative way 
recom m end th e  functions he describes5. How are we to resolve 
th is paradox? Or, if it is no paradox, how are we to reconcile 
the  two sta tem ents?  One way to view th is question is to draw  
a  distinction between lawyers and sociologists. This would be 
a  move which follows T aubes’ dictum . According to this, 
Luhm ann the  lawyer would be the conservative, and 
L uhm ann the  sociologist would be the progressive. However 
appealing th is suggestion may be, it is p u t into question by 
the fact th a t L uhm ann’s theory really does not lend itself to 
su ch  a  n ea t separation. The ’progressive’ sociologist h as  to 
face the  sam e problem as the ’conservative’ lawyer.
I shall ad ress both  aspects in w hat follows. First, I focus 
on some aspects of L uhm ann’s legal theoiy (I.) and then  tu rn  
to the  problem  of self-description of m odern society — a





























































































problem  which commonly is dealt w ith in  term s of 'critique of 
ideology’ (II.).
I.
L uhm ann’s writing on legal theory h as  been extensive from 
the  mid 1960s onwards. Here, however, I shall focus mainly 
on two writings from the 1980s, viz. Ausdifferenzierung des  
Rechts  and  Soziale System e. In w hat follows I w ish to direct 
the  atten tion  to the  questions of justice, law, norm s, values, 
and  conflict.
Confronting Luhm ann with au tho rs like H aberm as or 
Rawls, one would note th a t the  concept of legitimacy, which 
plays a  m ost im portan t role in their theories, is trea ted  by 





























































































For Luhm ann, m odern positive law provides its own 
legitimacy6, it is no t dependent on an  'overlapping 
consensus’7, nor on an  ethics of universal pragm atics8. 
Luhm ann, therefore, is m uch nearer to Anglo-am erican ways 
of addressing th is problem 9. The tradition  of positive law from 
Kelsen to H art to Dworkin is shared  by Luhm ann. According 
to Luhm ann, there is a  decisive difference betw een ancient 
and  m odern law. W hereas the  form er derived its validity from 
its environm ent, i.e. from a  'divine' or 'na tu ra l' order, the 
la tte r derives its validity from its own operations. M odern law 
itself establishes w hat is legal which is to say, it itself 
estab lishes its own validity. There is no place in m odern 
societies where an  objective and rational instance would
6 Significantly, he avoids speaking abou t legitimacy and 
uses the  term  of validity.
7 Jo h n  Rawls A Theory o f Justice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (1971).
8 H aberm as, Theory o f Communicative Action, Vol 1 and 2, 
Boston: Beacon Press (1984) and Cambridge: Polity Press 
(1987).
9 O ur initial s ta tem en t th a t Luhm ann is quite d istinct from 
Anglo-am erican thought h as  therefore to be a ttenuated , a t 




























































































reside10 and  which could provide a right answer. The reason  
therefore is, as shall become clearer in  section II., th a t  society 
h a s  no  possibility of perceiving itself as society. Only social 
subsystem s are  capable of self-observation and  self­
rep resen ta tion11.
Given th is prem ise, how can  we, for example, m ake sense 
of m oral conflict? How is one to evaluate the persistence of 
radically divergent conceptions of the good in m odern society? 
The general answ er would be th a t Luhm ann exam ines such  
questions no t from the viewpoint of m oral philosophy b u t 
from a  perspective of th e  sociology of law. This is to say th a t 
m oral questions are not looked a t by a  m oral theory which 
would only lead to paradoxes or infinite regresses since a
10 See also Luhm ann Ausdijferenzierung des Rechts.
Beitrâge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie. F rankfurt 
am  Main: Suhrkam p (1981); Soziale Systèm e. F rankfurt am 
Main: S uhrkam p (1984); T ranslation Social System s.
Stanford: Stanford University Press (forthcoming).
11 Cf. the  opposing approach of H aberm as, ’Kônnen 
konplexe G esellschaften eine vem ünftige Iden titâ t 
ausb ilden?’ in  Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen  
Materialismus. Frankfurt: Suhrkam p (1976). H aberm as does 
not accept L uhm ann’s concequences; he tries to keep open 




























































































m oral theory always w ants to be ’good’ and  not ’bad ’. 
Sociological inquiry, on the  o ther hand , can  afford to look a t 
real m echanism s in a  disin terested  way. The cool and 
analytical view m ay be of greater help th an  a  m oral way of 
looking a t things. We shall follow L uhm ann in th is 
orientation.
Perhaps the  m ost im portant approach in th is respect is 
L uhm ann’s elaboration of the  theory of double contingency 
and its corollaries. Departing from the prem ise of double 
contingency in social life12, the  question of how social order 
becom es possible is resolved by an  analysis of the 
m echanism s which lead to a  positive solution of th is double 
indeterm inacy. Expectations which can be fulfilled or 
frustra ted  (disappointed) become m ost crucial here. Basically 
there  are two types of expectations: expectations which are 
open to learning and  expectations which are  not. The first
12 Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils et al. (1951) Toward a 
General Theory o f  Action. Theoretical Foundations fo r  the 




























































































type is cognitive, th e  second normative'3. The cognitive type is 
differentiated and  institu tionalised  by science, the  norm ative 
type by law.
Values and  Norms
For L uhm ann, values are not generalized norm s. Values are 
simply ru les of preference, they do not contain  claim s abou t 
the  rightness of social action. This would be possible only if 
a  lexical ordering of values were a t our disposal, for example, 
only if we could ran k  liberty, peace, culture, and  profit on a 
scale, m aking su re  th a t profit does not figure h igher th an  
liberty13 4. B ut it is commonly accepted th a t su ch  a  scale is not 
available to u s 15. On the  contrary, we have innum erable 
values and  their ranking  is changing all the  time. Values are  
used  in  com m unication to test if specific expectations are
13 Cf. Luhm ann, Soziale Systèm e, p. 437; Rechtssoziologie. 
Reinbek: Rowohlt (1972), pp. 40 ff. T ranslated  as A 
Sociological Theory o f Law, London: Routledge (1985).
14 Luhm ann, Soziale Systèm e, pp. 433-4.




























































































realistic. In L uhm ann’s words, values are  used  in  ’probing’ 
specific expectations16
Turning to the  use  of the  term  ’norm ’ the  following should 
be noted. Luhm ann tries to find a  middle way between 
n a tu ra l rights theories and classical sociology. The form er is 
concerned with finding or justifying j u s t  norms, the latter 
explains the  existing social order in assum ing a  commonly 
shared  norm ative o rien tation17. Take, for example, the 
following sta tem ent by Parsons:
’Furtherm ore, the  double contingency implies the 
norm ative orientation of action, since a lte r’s reaction of 
pun ishm en t or reward is superadded  to a lter’s ’in trinsic’ 
or direct behavioral reaction to ego’s original selection. If 
pun ishm en t or reward by alter is repeatedly m anifested 
u nder certain  conditions, th is reaction acquires for ego the 
m eaning of an  appropriate consequence of ego’s conformity
16 Cf. Luhm ann, Soziale Systèm e ; for the difference between 
values and  program m s, see ibid., pp. 432 ff.
17 ’In con trast to the old E uropean theory of society, we do 
no t begin from norm ative presuppositions. Nor like 
D urkheim  or Parsons do we view the concept of norm s as 
the  u ltim ate explanation of the fact or possibility of social 




























































































w ith or deviation from the  norm s of a  shared symbolic 
system .''8.
In com m enting on th is  passage, L uhm ann points ou t th a t 
Parsons should  have em phasized ’repeatedly’ instead  of 
’shared  symbolic system ’18 9. This is to say, th a t  only u nder the 
condition of repeated experiences a  ’shared  symbolic system ’ 
can  arise: th e  dim ension of tim e is constitutive of all social 
order. And it is precisely here th a t  the  ’no rm s’ are located (cf. 
ibid., p. 429). The ta sk  for social theory, therefore, is m uch 
m ore difficult.
The danger of the norm ative approach to norm s lies in  its 
naive idealism  as is expressed in its basic assum ptions of a 
social con tract and the supposed situation  of free choice a t 
the  point of its emergence. The danger of the classical
18 Parsons e t al.. General Theory, p. 16, orig. em phasis. The 
passage continues: 'A shared  symbolic system  is a  system  of
’ways of orienting’, p lus those ’external sym bols' which control 
these ways of orienting, the system  being so geared into the 
action system s of bo th  ego and  alter th a t the  external symbol 
bring forth the  sam e or a  com plem entary p a tte rn  of 
orientation in  bo th  of them . Such a  system , w ith its m utuality  
of norm ative orientation, is logically the  m ost elem entary form 
of cu lture... cu ltu re  provides the  s tandards  (value-orientations) 
w hich are  applied in  evaluative processes.’




























































































sociological approach (which takes existing norm s as 
explanatory of social order) evades the question of how social 
order is possible in the  first place. It begs the question since 
it refers the problem  to the p as t supposing th a t it h a s  already 
been solved. In o ther words, w hereas the norm ative approach 
tries to find legitim ate solutions for society, the sociological 
approach  tries to explain social cohesion by an  axiomatic 
setting  of generally accepted norm s. W hich escape route does 
Luhm ann propose?
According to Luhm ann, holding oneself bound to norm s is 
in effect a  pervasive fact of social life which can  be explained 
by the  necessity of m eaningful and  self-referential 
reproduction of these norm s. This approach is m ore am bitious 
in th a t it tries to show m echanism s of reproduction of norm s 
in time. Norms and  their reproduction are seen as an  ongoing 
process. They emerge whenever m eaningful generalizations are 
necessaiy  which can  be claimed in a  counterfactual way. 
Expectations which are valid w ithout respect to factual events 
are  called generalized expectations. They leave open w hat 




























































































tem poral, a  m aterial and  a  social dim ension20. Norms are 
located in  the  tem poral dim ension w hereas persons, roles, 
values and  program m es are located in the  ’Sachdim ension’ (of. 
ibid., pp. 429 ff.).
Law
Those norm ative expectations which are not open to learning 
processes are obviously crucial. Normative expectations are 
conditioned by a  sort of 'safety n e t’, by the social institu tion  
of law. They can  be fu rther distinguished into conform ant and 
deviant behaviour, viz. tolerated and prohibited behaviour. 
However, no t all norm ative expectations are  law. As Luhm ann 
points out.
'Additionally, consensus m u st be presupposed not only for 
the  norm ative style of expectation b u t also for the 
read iness to impose sanctions and for the  carrying ou t of 
conflicts where these expectations are thw arted. In th is 
respect, law is no t only a  m eans of solving social conflicts, 
b u t, in  the  first place, and m ost im portant, a  m eans of 
creating social conflict: a  prop for presum ptions, dem ands





























































































and  rejections even in cases where resistance is 
expected.’21.
In claiming th a t m odern law always plays the double role of 
creating and  solving social conflict, Luhm ann shows th a t he 
directly opposes Neo-Kantian theories such  as Rawls’ and 
H aberm as’. To recall, Rawls’ in terest lies in the  conditions for 
a ’ju s t ’ society, H aberm as’ in terest lies in a  rational society in 
which consensus, founded solely on the  force of the  better 
argum ent, plays the constitutive role. For Luhm ann, these 
considerations belong to a  discourse whose presuppostions 
have been superseded by the conditions of m odernity, i.e. by 
the  condition of a highly differentiated society. For him, law 
supports  behaviour which otherwise could not be sustained , 
for example in cases where one is the w eaker or liable to be 
attacked  on m oral grounds. In th is sense, law secures 
freedom, including freedom of conflict and  freedom of socially 
undesirab le behaviour. Neither ethics nor reason can achieve 
th is fundam ental function of law since both of them  have to 
align them selves too strongly with desired or desirable
21 Luhm ann, Soziale Systèm e, p. 451, my transi.; see also 




























































































resu lts22. This indicates not only th a t L uhm ann refuses 
H aberm as’ m oral philosophy b u t also th a t he ou tstrip s Rawls’ 
liberalism .
C ontradictions in society have the function of alarm  
signals, they serve as  a  sort of im m une-system  w ithin the 
social system . Luhm ann considers two com plem entary 
im m une system s; law and conflicts. Law antic ipates possible 
conflicts in  selecting from the m any everyday expectations 
those w hich m ight prove to be relevant. Law operates w ith the 
d istinction legal/illegal and with the secondary coding of 
perm itted /p roh ib ited23. This leads to an  increase in  possible 
conflicts b u t also to a  precise response from the  legal system . 
It conceives conflicts a s  d istu rbances w hich m u st be 
overcome. Law can  fulfil th is function because  it is detached 
from m orals. It is therefore able to prohibit som ething 
perm issible and  to perm it som ething prohibited.
22 Cf. Ausdijjerenzierung, p. 105.





























































































Conflict m eans the com m unication of a  rejected expectation. 
W here ’No' is com m unicated, conflict gains social existence24. 
This is im portan t to u nders tand  L uhm ann’s conceptualization 
of stability and instability in society. R eturning to the above 
m entioned crucial role which expectations play in social life, 
the  question of instabilities in social system s arises quite 
naturally . It is possible th a t an  escalation of instabilities 
w ithin social system s could lead to their self-destruction. We 
have seen above th a t values are used  in testing the ground 
for behaviour. Here Luhm ann, in  a  counter-in tu itive m anner, 
assigns also to conflicts the function of stabilizing system s 
since conflicts reduce the insecurity regarding expectations. 
Contrary to common usage, Luhm ann a ttribu tes to conflicts 
the  function th a t they facilitate  social action. For example, in 
supposing th a t alter is the enemy (Gegner), ego gains certainty 
for fu rther expectations. Conflicts enable ego to derive 
certain ty  in situations of uncertainty, precisely by m eans of




























































































conflict25. A conflict is the  operational autonom ization of a 
contradiction by m eans of com m unication26. It is therefore 
misconceived to  explain conflicts by a  failure of 
com m unication — an  explanation which presupposes th a t 
com m unication as such  was som ething good w hich could fail. 
In L uhm ann’s version, conflict is separated  from purely 
observed antagonism s of interests, from general 
contradictions, even from m utual dam age27. Conflicts therefore 
exist within  o ther system s w ithout becoming subsystem s 
them selves. Their mode of existence is purely parasitic. 
Nevertheless, conflict itself can be seen  as a social system  
which operates according to its own logic, which sp reads out, 
moblilises resources, dem ands time and  eventually occupies 
the  system  in which the  conflict was generated .28 To relate
25 Ausdifferenzierung, p. 98.
26 Soziale Systèm e, p. 530.
27 See Soziale Systèm e, p. 531, note 62 for som e references.
28 It should  be noted th a t not every social system  is a t the
sam e tim e a  functional subsystem  of society. Generally, 
L uhm ann considers the  following as functional subsystem s: 
economy, politics, science, law, religion, education, see, for 
example, Niklas Luhm ann, Ôkologische Kommunikation. 
Opladen: W estdeutscher Verlag (1986). T ranslated  as




























































































th is problem atic to the legal system , it should be recalled (cf. 
supra) th a t law plays a double role here: conflicts are solved 
through law, and  conflicts are generated through  law. To 
prevent conflicts from spreading out too far and  unfolding 
their destructive force, th ird  parties play an  im portan t role in 
providing security  on the basis of instability29. Third parties 
help to transform  the conflict into ’issu es’ and to further 
decompose the them e of the conflict into smaller, m anageable 
questions. It is significant th a t Luhm ann does not speak of 
th ird  parteis as  'arb iters’ which would probabaly suggest too 
strong a  sim ilarity to an  objective overlooker. For Luhm ann, 
the  th ird  party  is neu tra l essentially in the beginning.
The im portant question which arises on the  basis of this 
definition is the question of the conditions which determ ine 
the  selection from the vast and pervasive existence of 
conflicts. In o ther words, which out of the  innum erable 
conflicts which emerge every day gain significance beyond the 
level of interaction? W hich conflicts gain general social




























































































significance? It is the function of law and  m orals to check the 
suitability  of special conflicts for general social 
com m unication. Conflicts are thereby conditioned either by 
restricting adm issible m eans (e.g. violence), or by increasing 
insecurity  (e.g. appeal to th ird  parties)30.
Traditionally, law was the m ost im portan t m eans of 
selecting am ong conflicts, to adm it or to tran sp o rt small 
conflicts into the  social arena. In the transition  to m odernity, 
th is  legal function did not get lost b u t w as based on different 
grounds. The sem antics of n a tu re  were su b stitu ted  by a 
sem antics of freedom. Rights were a ttribu ted  to individuals. 
This individualization leads to a  decoupling of n a tu ra l bonds 
w hich are, in tu rn , replaced by bonds which a re  freely 
chosen. People shift their a ttitudes and  engagem ents, they 
follow fashions and  moods. This leads to an  aggregation and 
accum ulation  on the level of collective identities. The m ost 
im portan t example is th a t of social m ovem ents. Social 
m ovem ents, like law, are  selecting conflicts w hich are  to have




























































































significance on a legal or political level. For example, race 
discrim ination conncected to im m igration is taken  up  by a 
union  or social m ovem ent and  m ade into a  political issue. 
This is the m echanism  by which com m unications on the level 
of in teraction  get ’resonance’ on the  level of social system s.
Justice
We are  no longer able to describe single legal decisions as 
ju s t  or u n ju st. This is only possible with respect to the  legal 
system  as a  whole. Traditionally, justice  h a s  been discussed 
in term s of perfection and perfectability31 32. However, w ithin this 
notion of perfection there is also contained a  w eaker notion 
of development, since perfection is the end-sta te  of a 
development32. In case the process of perfection does no t exist
31 Ausdifferenzierung, pp. 378 ff. for some historical 
sources.
32 See Philippe van Parijs Evolutionary Explanation in the 
Social Sciences. A n Emerging Paradigm. London and New 
York: Tavistock (1981), p. 51 for a  distinction between a 
strong (’evolutionist’) and  a  w eak (’evolutionary’) form of 
evolutionary explanation. See, also, Karl E. Weick The 
Social Psychology o f  Organizing. R ead in g /M ass.: 
Addison-Wesley. Second edition (1979) p. 119 and  Donald 
T. Campbell V ariation and Selective Retention in 




























































































or does not lead to its culm ination (i.e. the  realization of the 
idea), nevertheless, the process as such  rem ains. This is to 
say  th a t  the  notion of development su b s titu te s  the  notion of 
perfection33. A reason  why ju stice  m ight no t be perceived in 
perfectionist term s h as  to do with the  s tru c tu re  of the  legal 
system  itself. The idea of perfect ju stice  w as related  to a 
specific concept of the  unity  of the  legal order, th a t is, to an  
order which consisted  only of legal acts (Recht) b u t  no t of 
illegal ac ts (Unrecht). Only on th is condition, i.e. th a t the 
illegal w as excluded from the  legal order, could a  perfectionist 
perspective be derived. Conversely, if the  legal system  is 
conceptualized as  containing both Recht and  Unrecht, the 
perfectionist perspective becomes unfeasible since any 
developm ent of the  legal system  develops both, Recht and  
U nrecht34. B ut how can  we, on th is basis, conceive of justice?
69-85.
33 See L uhm ann’s instructive, albeit tentative d iscussion  of 
adaption, m orphogenesis and teleology in Soziale System e, 
pp. 477 ff.




























































































Luhm ann provides the following solution: ju stice  is 
adequate complexity of the legal system . The complexity of the 
legal system  is adequate if and  insofar it is com patible with 
concrete decisions w ithin the system 35. The criterion of justice  
is the  extent to which the legal system  can  adequately deal 
with complexity. There may arise serious problem s where the 
legal system  increases its complexity up to a  point where it 
can no longer come to decisions. In such  cases the  legal 
system  would not have adequate complexity b u t simply would 
be blocked. The overburdening of the legal system  can lead to 
a  situation  of indeterminacy. This would be the  case when 
rights, norm s and  rules are m ade which are  contradictory. 
For example, a  right to a  sound environm ent m ay be 
incom patible with a  right to property and  free enterprise, and 
m ay lead to indeterm inacy in  the case of an  en trepreneur who 
pollutes the environm ent. As Luhm ann m ain tains, th is 
problem  is a real danger for the legal system  because the 
dem ands of society press the legal system  ever more in the 
direction of increased complexity. However, the  complexity




























































































dem anded by society is always higher th a n  the complexity 
w hich can  be realized w ithin the legal system ; only a  small 
range of social actions can  become legally relevant facts36.
The consequences of th is approach are  startling , even 
frightening, as Luhm ann him self adm its. L uhm ann concedes 
th a t H aberm as and  others have a  justified  concern  in 
critizising ac tual legal practices. However, L uhm ann argues, 
su ch  criticism s are bound to rem ain on the  level of 
’experience’ (erleben), they cannot be transform ed into m odes 
of action a t the  level of the  system . The spheres of action and 
of experience are divided sharply in m odern societies37. More 
generally speaking, th is criticism  is directed against the 
illusion th a t a  substan tive concept of ju stice  m ight be 
available to u s  which in  tu rn  could be applied to single cases. 
The only criterion which rem ains seem s to be the  ru le to treat 
equal cases equally and unequal cases unequally . This device 
seem s to secure  the compatibility required w ithin the  legal
36 Cf. ibid.., p. 392 and  generally, Soziale Systèm e, pp. 249
f.




























































































system  and  to m ake decisions easier. In a  way, th is  rule also 
helps to reduce complexity38.
For Luhm ann, then, there can be no ultim ate criteria of 
ju stice  (or: of legitimation) behind  the legal system . It is the 
legal system  itself th a t  creates law and it is a  feature of 
positive law th a t it provides the validity (Geltungsgrund) of its 
own. Against Rawls’ idea of an  ’overlapping consensus’ and 
against H aberm as’ claim th a t legality has be susta ined  from 
outside the legal system  by legitimacy, Luhm ann holds tha t 
positive law is never supported  by a  real consensus39. More 
generally, legitim ation is generated w ithin the  political system, 
th a t is, outside the legal system. Conversely, H aberm as seem s 
to claim  th a t law cannot be conceived as a  subsystem  of 
society since it h as  not lost its inherent links to politics and 
m orals40. This is to say th a t law has to cope with questions
38 ibid., pp. 391, 406.
39 ibid., p. 1981: 132.
40 Cf. Ju rg en  H aberm as, ’Law and Morality’, The Tanner 
Lectures on H um an Values vol. VIII, ed. M. McMurrin. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1988); Tow ards a 
Com m unication-Concept of Rational Collective W ill-Formation. 




























































































of legitim ation as well as  w ith questions of m oral justice . To 
be su re , H aberm as takes great pains to prove th is point with 
historical and  theoretical argum ents; however, in my view, his 
position often cannot avoid giving the im pression th a t it does 
not adm it w hat would not be desirable from a  norm ative 
viewpoint.
Rawls and H aberm as are similar to n a tu ra l law theorists 
in adopting a  schem a according to which conform ity and 
deviance select am ong social behaviour. However, according 
to Luhm ann, u nder the conditions of m odernity we w itness a 
fu rther differentiation. According to his analysis, it is a basic 
tra it of functionally differentiated societies th a t social links get 
loosened. As a  resu lt of the process of individualization41 we 
have to reckon with the  possibility th a t the  norm -schem a as 
such  gets challenged. This possibility stem s from the  fact th a t 
people are  socialized and governed by codes, no t by persons42.
41 See also S tephen  Holmes ’A ristippus in  and  o u t of A thens’ 
73 The American Political Science Review  (1979), pp. 113-127.
42 In a  sim ilar way, Marx claimed th a t people in m odem  
capitalist societies are dom inated by abstractions, cf. Karl 





























































































’Codes’ are differences, like pow er/w eakness, legal/illegal, 
tru e /fa lse , good/evil etc. Therefore real dangers arise if whole 
populations are  governed and  socialized by su ch  codes over 
several generations43. Using the  concept of the re-introduction 
of the excluded third?4, resu lts  in m odern societies, as a 
consequence of their own operations, producing a ’quiet 
reservoir for p ro test m ovem ents of all k inds’45. Insofar as 
social m ovem ents engage in  a  rejection of th is norm -schem a, 
they are not likely to be successful since they limit them selves 
to ab strac t negation. They are  also dangerous insofar as they 
w ant to reverse functional differentiation. With regard to 
au tho rs  who tiy  to combine the viewpoint of the  legal system  
with th a t  of social m ovem ents under the  heading of ’civil
43 Cf. Soziale Systèm e, pp. 44-5. It seem s ironic th a t 
Luhm ann, who eschews any reference to the hum an ist 
tradition  of thought a t the level of h is theoretical design, 
seem s to  be inspired exactly by ’hum an ism ’ w hen — however 
cautiously — criticising the p resen t sta te  of affairs.
44 Drawing on Michel Serres, Le Parasite. Paris: G rasset et 
Frasquelle (1980) and  George Spencer Brown, Law s o f  Form. 
2nd. ed. London: Allen & Unwin (1971).




























































































disobedience’, Luhm ann holds th a t they tend  to forget th a t 
society’s stability calls for a  clear Yes for society’...46
B ut let u s  now see in  which way Luhm ann analyzes the 
problem  of m odern society’s self-description and  in  which way 
his version of system s theory h as  affinities to conservative or 
progressive ideologies.
II.
L uhm ann draw s a  radical conclusion from the wiedely 
accepted sociological view th a t m odern societies are 
functionally differentiated. The conclusion is th a t there  is no 
centre or top which would allow for a  privileged point of 
observation or description of the whole of society. Or, m ore 
precisely, they have no m eans to re-introduce the un ity  of the 
social system  into the  social system  via self-observation or 
self-description. M odern societies, instead, invent self-




























































































descriptions in the  form of ideologies. Ideologies are 
simplifying and  focus always on particu lar features of the  
system  in question. Luhm ann distinguishes between 
conservative and progressive (revolutionaiy) ideologies. At the 
basis  of these ideologies there is a  curious type of self- 
reflexion of society. W henever societies reflect on their unity, 
they have two basic forms of self-description and  self­
reflexion: tautology and  paradox. In the  tautological version, 
society is w hat it is. In the paradoxical version, society is 
w hat it is no t47.
These two versions correspond to the  conservative- 
/progressive d istinction and it is easy to see how. W hereas 
conservative ideologies affirm the existing social order (i.e. 
functional subsystem s in L uhm ann’s term s), progressive or 
revolutionary ideologies see society as w hat it is not. They try 
to bring abou t a  society which does ’not yet’ exist. 
Conservative ideologies have it th a t  society’s potential is 
realized, therefore all th a t rem ains to be done is to improve





























































































on its problem-solving. Conversely, revolutionary ideologies 
have it th a t society’s potential h as  still to be realized, 
therefore society is w hat it is no t (yet).
This leads to a  self-blocking of both  the  observed system  
and  the  observer since we do not get ou t of the  problem  in 
analyzing it. W hat we have to do, Luhm ann recom m ends, is 
to look a t how the  system  itself un-blocks the situation. And 
it does th is  th rough  the ’unfolding’ of its self-referentiality in 
breaking it up  and  in terpreting it in one way or another. The 
choice itself cannot be justified. Such an  operation of de- 
tautologizing and  de-paradoxizing dem ands th a t bo th  the 
operation and  the  underlying problem  be concealed.
M odern society uses th is form of resolving its paradoxes 
b u t it canno t adm it th a t it does. Neither can it adm it th a t its 
a ttem pt a t self-description am ounts to tautologies and 
paradoxes in the first place. It conceals its identity and is by 
th is m eans (and only by th is m eans) able to form a  reflective 
theory. And only an  observer can  see this. Only he can  see 




























































































theoretical m outhpiece of th is problem atic, is caught up  in 
exactly the  sam e situa tion48. Here one could ask  the  following 
questions: W here does Luhm ann s tand?  Is Luhm ann 
L uhm ann or is Luhm ann not L uhm ann? Luhm ann would not 
have been Luhm ann had  he not taken  pains to avoid a  simple 
answer. One m ight object here (and Luhm ann did so) th a t I 
am  focussing too strongly on personal features, thereby 
neglecting the  more general problem  which system s theory as  
such  faces. However, I th ink  it is legitimate to d iscuss 
L uhm ann’s thought in  a  prom inent way since it is he who 
gave system s theory a  specific brand . Certainly, the  ideological 
im plications of the  H aberm as/L uhm ann  debate a t the 
beginning of the 70s stam ped him  as a  ’conservative’49, and,
48 There m ight be some controversy on the  point of w hether 
Luhm ann’s theory is sim pler or m ore complex th a n  social 
reality. For the  sake of the argum ent let u s  assum e th a t the 
theory and its object have more or less the sam e complexity.
49 Cf., for example, H aberm as’ verdict th a t systems theory 
am ounts to a  ’negative utopia of technical control over h istory’ 
in which hum an , no longer occupied the  position of homo 
fa b er  b u t of homo fabricatus  (Habermas, Technology and 
Science as  ’Ideology” in  Toward a  Rational Society. Boston: 
Beacock (1970), p. 106; see also Thom as McCarthy, 
’Complexity and  Democracy, or The Seducem ents of System s 
Theory’ in New German Critique 35  (1985), p. 28. But 
H aberm as him self m ade considerable use  of th a t theory after 
the  debate w ith Luhm ann. As Thom as M cCarthy rem arked, 




























































































a t tim es, it seem s as if he would happily accept th is label 
knowing th a t the  assertion  of good in ten tions gives rise to 
contrary  suspicions. B ut ap art from these partly  idiosyncratic 
featu res of the debate such  a  characterization would not do 
ju stice  to h is theoiy.
In o ther words, if Luhm ann proceeds in the sam e way as 
m odern societies do, m ight it not be, then, th a t Luhm ann 
him self hides away behind paradoxes and  tautologies? He has 
to decide w hether to take the  side of tautology (conservatism) 
or the  side of paradox (progressivism), and  if he does, he has 
to hide the  operation50. From M erleau-Ponty, Bateson, and
’L uhm ann’s conceptual and  theoretical v irtuosity’ (ibidem, 
p.47) — b u t for M cCarthy ’it is not clear ju s t  where the need 
for system s theoiy arises’ (id., 51). True enough, H aberm as’ 
left-wing audience always w atched with suspicion th e  fact th a t 
the  m aste r took up  theoretical tools from system s theoiy . In 
their view, H aberm as was compromizing w ith the  devil.
50 Cf. also Ricoeur: ’Because the absolu te  overlooker is 
impossible, th en  it is someone within the process itself who 
takes the  responsiblity for judgem ent.' However, Ricoeur 
claim s th a t th is  taking of a  viewpoint am oun ts to advancing 
a  utopian model on the  basis of which one envisages ’a  be tte r 
fu tu re  for hum anity ’. In consequence, he  replaces the 
d is tin c tio n  ideo logy /sc ience  w ith th e  d is tin c tio n  
ideology/utopia, cf. Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and  
Utopia. George H. Taylor ed. New York: Colum bia University 




























































































Spencer Brown, Luhm ann takes up  the m essage ’Draw a 
distinction!’ M aking a  distinction estab lishes a  universe, sets 
up  system ic boundaries, s tru c tu res  a discourse. Once the 
d istinction is m ade, we are talking abou t this, and  not about 
tha t. In a  often repeated and som ew hat cryptic ph rase  we are 
told th a t it is a  difference which m akes the difference51. Here 
we can  d istinguish  between two levels, the level of reality 
(where real events create differences and  real system s 
estab lish  their unity) and a  level of observing these  system s. 
The la tter activity, usually  called second-order observation, 
exposes itself in tu rn  to observation. Or, in  the  words of 
Heinz von Foerster: ’I subm it th a t the  cybernetics of observed  
sy stem s  we m ay consider to be first-order cybernetics; while 
second-order cybernetics is the  cybernetics of observing 
system s.’52. From  th is standpoin t it m ay be claimed th a t the 
distinctions which are  draw n by an  observer only express his
51 See, for example, Gregory Bateson, Steps to an  Ecology o f 
Mind. S an  Francisco: Chandler (1972), p. 315.
52 Heinz von Foerster, ’Cybernetics of Cybernetics’ in  K, 
Krippendorff (ed.) Communication and Control in Society. New 




























































































bias53. It would follow th a t the observer is no t able to exem pt 
h im self/herself from the  strictu res of the  observed objects 
since he draw s ju s t  some o ther differences w ithout ever being 
able to reach  the  ’view from nowhere', i.e. abso lu te  tru th . 
Every observation is m ade on the  basis of a  blind spot. The 
observer cannot see w hat he cannot see. This is possible only 
for o ther observers. L uhm ann resorts to second order 
cybernetics to avoid precisely the 'paradox of the  sub jec t’, i.e. 
th a t there  is some ultim ate instance which does n o t fail54.
53 This is a  corollary of the fact th a t an  observer uses 
distinctions which he cannot them atize while applying them .
54 In a  brilliant d iscussion of M annheim ’s sociology of 
knowledge, Ricoeur comes to a  sim ilar conclusion. He 
advances a  'post-m arxist concept of ideology' which becom es 
inevitable once ’we acknowledge th a t the objective ontological 
un ity  of the  world h as  collapsed. We live spiritually  in  a 
polemical s itua tion  of conflicting world views which are, for 
one another, ideologies. We face a process of m u tu a l labelling; 
an  ideology is always the  ideology of the  o ther.’ (Ricoeur, 
Lectures, p. 163). The reason  why the m arxist concept of 
ideology no longer works, is spelled out in the  following way: 
’For M annheim  ... the process of disintegration h a s  proceeded 
so far th a t  all class consciousnesses are caught in  the  
destructive process of collapse. There is a  lack o f  a  center in 
th e  evolution of h um an  society. Because there is no tru e  
universality  anywhere, no group may claim  to be the  bearer 




























































































Society as su ch  is no t able to produce true  self­
descriptions, therefore it resorts to ideologies. These ideologies 
are  essentially based  on tautologies and paradoxes. However, 
according to Luhm ann, tautologies and paradoxes are of little 
help. Both are  essentially sterile. An observer cannot predict 
which of the two possibilities will be chosen, no r can he 
recom m end which to chose, nor can  he predict w hat 
consequences will follow in adopting one or the other.
Let u s  now engage in observation of observation and  look 
a t L uhm ann’s theory with the  sam e conceptual tools. We ask: 
which side does Luhm ann take? W here is h is blind spot? One 
could say th a t as  far as the purely theoretical ap p ara tu s  is 
concerned, su ch  questions do not arise. But they certainly do 
arise as  soon as  practical im plications come to the fore and 
here he  seem s to have a  conservative b ias55. For example, he
55 Cf. Cesare Luporini 'Governare il m ondo o cam biarlo’ in 
22 Problemi del Socialismo (1981), pp. 57-70; Danilo Zolo 
'Autopoiesis. Un Paradigm a Conservatore’ 1 MicroMega (1986), 
pp. 129 ff. ; Ulrich Ròdel, G ünther Frankenberg and  Helmut 
Dubiel (1989) Die demokratische Frage. Frankfurt: Suhrkam p; 
G ünther Frankenberg ’U nordnung kan n  sein. V ersuch über 
Systèm e, Recht und  U ngehorsam ’ in  A. H onneth, T. 
M cCarthy, C. Offe & A. Wellmer (eds.) Zwischenbetrachtungen  
im Prozeji der Aujklàrung. Frankfurt: Suhrkam p (1989) for 




























































































clearly favours society’s stability56 and ’R echtssicherheit’ which 
in the  view of m any leftists would be a  conservative 
H obbesian standpo in t57. B ut the m eaning of the  term s 
conservative and  progressive are shifting as  a  resu lt of the 
temporalization of ideologies. Luhm ann draw s on Reinhard 
Koselleck’s work58 who showed how m any concepts, among 
them  ’ideology’, in the middle of the 18th cen tu iy  changed 
their m eaning. They were no longer linked to nature  b u t  to 
historical tim e and  the p resen t situa tion  of society. 
Accelerated social change underm ines the  opposition 
conservative/progressive and leads partly to an  in terchange of
56 Niklas Luhm ann, W iderstandsrecht und  politische Gewalt’ 
5 Zeitschrift fü r  Rechtssoziologie (1984), p. 36.
57 W ith slight irony he rem arks th a t people in Germ any 
reacted in  an  allergical way even to a  p lanned  census, see 
L uhm ann W er sagt das? ’ Delfin 12 (1989), p. 90. In an 
Interview he said: Weil m ir gar keine andere  Gesellschaft 
vorschw ebt als die, die wir haben, will ich au ch  die vielen 
positiven Seiten u nseres System s aufzeigen. Es geht also n ich t 
um  A blehnung oder Zustim m ung zu dieser Gesellschaft, 
sondem  um  ein besseres V erstândnis ih rer s truk tu re llen  
Risiken, ih rer Selbstgefàhrdungen, ih rer evolutionâren 
U nw ahrscheinlichkeit.’ ’Biographie, A ttitüden, Z ette lkasten’ in 
D. Baecker and  G. Stanizek (eds.) Niklas Luhmann. 
Archim edes und  wir. Interviews. Berlin: Merve (1987), p. 155.
58 Cf. R einhart Koselleck, Futures Past. On the Sem antics o f  





























































































them es and  issues between the sides. For example, m any on 
the  political left are dealing today  w ith them es like cu ltural 
pessim ism , critique of technology and  call upon th e  sta te  (e.g. 
to prevent ecological crises) — clearly old issues of the  political 
right59. This insight is all the more significant in a  situation  
which lacks clear answ ers to the question W hat is left?’
B ut even on the theoretical level the question is not so 
easy to decide. C ontraiy to m any criticism s which have it th a t 
L uhm ann’s practising of the functional m ethod has 
conservative im plications, one could claim  th a t th is method, 
conversely, leads to a  critical approach. The potential for 
criticism  lies in  the fact th a t existing arrangem ents are 
in terpreted  in a  way which stresses their contingency. T hat 
which is contingent is neither necessary  nor impossible. 
’Kontingent ist etwas, was weder notwendig ist noch 
unm oglich ist; was also so, wie es ist ... sein  kann , aber auch  
anders moglich is t.’60. To show both  th a t things are possible
59 Cf. th e  curious self-description of the G erm an Green Party 
W e are  neither left nor right, b u t far ah ead ’.




























































































the  way they are  and  th a t they could be otherwise gives the 
theory critical potential. To p u t the problem  in th is way, 
however, is also to reform ulate the  difference between 
tautology and  paradox. Things are  w hat they are  and  they are 
w hat they  are  not. However, Luhm ann indicates yet another 
im portan t difference betw een tautology and  paradox. He 
refuses to trea t them  as logically a pair, since they are not 
equivalent. A tautology can  be seen as a  paradox, w hereas the 
reverse is no t true. Tautologies are differences w hich do not 
m ake the  difference. In th is way Luhm ann explains why m any 
people th ink  it quite n a tu ra l th a t intellectuals have a b ias 
tow ards left-wing politics, since it is m ore challenging and 
fruitful to resolve paradoxes th an  tautologies. Another 
form ulation is significant here. W hen L uhm ann speaks of the 
m erits of second order cybernetics (the observing of the 
observer) he em phasizes th a t th is  is the  only possible goal of 
enlightenm ent (Aufklarung) which does not lead to well-known 
self-contradictions61.




























































































L uhm ann h as  been reproached also with respect to his 
judgem ent of the  new social m ovem ents. W hat does his 
conservatism  am oun t to? Obviously there  is h is s tance to 
’defend’ society against p ro test m ovem ents which, in  their 
various radical guises, ultim ately or implicitly dem and the 
abolition of functional differentiation of society. According to 
Luhm ann, su ch  a  criticism  is a  m oral criticism  since it cannot 
show the  alternatives fo r  society. It cannot be taken  seriously 
a s  a  social criticism  since it confronts social operations with 
criteria alien to them . For example, m odern society is 
criticised as ’in hum an’ because its economy operates on such  
distinctions like having and not having property. The political 
system  operates on the basis  of having or no t having power. 
Both system s th u s  produce people on the ’shadow side’, i.e. 
poor and  powerlessness. W heras a  social criticism  would try 
to change certain  (undesirable) s ta tes  of affairs taking into 
account the  basic m odes of operation, a  m oral criticism  would 
ju s t  reject such  outcom es and the  system s which produce 
them 62. However, such  m oral com m unications ju s t  trickle
62 A fam ous slogan from the s tu d e n ts ’ movem ent was The 




























































































away, they are  not able to cause  resonance in the  functional 
subsystem s of society. They rem ain on the level of interaction. 
Let u s  change perspective and  perceive the  m oral criticism  
from the  standpo in t of society. Here the  m oral criticism  can 
be understood  only in term s of society’s self-destruction. This 
is the  case if its stability, i.e. its form of differentiation, its 
way of draw ing its system ic boundaries, is challenged. Such 
a  challenge can  only be conceived by society as  its  own 
catastrophe. If the  basic principles of social organization are 
th rea tened , society disintegrates. Luhm ann, the  sociologist, 
seem s tem pted to take the standpoin t of society. B ut if he 
were to, he would be attem pting som ething which, according 
to h is theory, is impossible.
The question of w hether Luhm ann succeeds in resolving 
his paradoxes rem ains an  open one. Is L uhm ann L uhm ann or 
is he  no t L uhm ann? Is he breaking the  self-referentiality and 
privileging one over the other, thereby concealing his 
operation? The observers of his theory are  invited to find out 
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